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ARMY GROUND FORCES BOARD MITOUSA



Report No. 505

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22 June 1945.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF 91ST CAVALRY RECOGNATISSANCE TROOP, HUICHINIZED, DURING BOLOGNA - PO VALLEY OFFENSIVE

(Reported by Colonel T. Q. Donaldson, Jr., Cavalry)

Observer's note: 1. The attached report of operations of the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, during the Bologna - Po Valley offenisve, was obtained from Captain Clifford E. Lippincott, Cavalry, the troop Commander.

2. This troop operated with its parent unit, the 91st Infantry Division, commanded by Major General W. G. Livesay, under the control of II Corps of the Fifth Army.

3. It will be noted that this troop was not employed in general as a unit. The division commander, particularly during the latter part of the campaign, assigned the various plateons to work with regiments and a separate task force. As brought out by the troop commander, there were times when conflicting orders might result from such a situation, and which could readily cause him embarrassment. However, such was not the case, and the results obtained by this troop were most gratifying.

l Inclosure Appendix l

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91ST CAVALRY RECONNVISSANCE TROOP (Mechanized) APO 91, U. S. Army

25 Hay 1945

SUBJECT: Report of 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized.

- TO : Colonel T. Q. Donaldson, AGF Board, F. L. C., APO 777, U. S. Army.
- 1. In compliance with letter Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, A. P. 0. 777, U. S. Army, dated 4 May 45, the following report is submitted:
- a. In preparation for the initial push off, the mission of the troop was to initially assist the infantry attack by fire from 37mm guns of the light armored cars, to be prepared in case of a breakthrough to push rapidly forward in the division zene and maintain contact with the enemy, to establish and man division OP's as directed. For disposition of the troop see Overlay "A". In addition to supporting the attack by 37mm fire, two mortar crews, with 81mm mortars were attached to "H" Company, of the 362d Infantry Regiment. Prior to the jump-off, the guns of the armored cars were registered on pre-arranged targets as requested by the infantry regiment. With the data obtained and using "luminous buttons" the troop fired one thousand and seventy-six (1,076) rounds during the general preparatory fire. On the 17th of April the 361st Infantry Regiment requested fire on lit. Adone and vicinity. In reply to this request the eight (8) guns of the 1st and 3d plateons fired 2,546 rounds of 37mm HE.

Initially, two division OP's were established—No. 1 by the 1st platoon and No. 2 by the 2d platoon. On the 18th of April OP No. 3 was established on Mt. Adone by the 2d platoon. On the 19th of April, OP No. 2 abandoned as useless and OP No. 1 was moved to the vicinity of M. Pesigliano.

b. On the 21st of April, the troop's mission was changed to precede the infantry assault elements in the division zone and maintain contact with the 6th South African Armored Division and assault regiments. To accomplish this, one plateon was assigned the mission of maintaining the contact—one armored car and 1/4 ton truck (peep) was with each assault battalion CP and the remainder of the plateon was with the 6th South Africans and there were no friendly troops known on the right flank of the division. It was mutually agreed that instead of the forward reconnaissance, a flank screen was more necessary. Thus a plateon was given the mission of gaining contact with friendly troops on the right and screening the flank until close contact could be obtained. The other plateon was held in reserve.

On the 22d of April, the troop CP, 2d plateen and the trains were together just north of Highway 12. The 1st plateen continued to screen the right flank of the division. The 3d plateen reported positions of advance elements, when possible, and made liaison with the elements of 361st and 362d Infentry Regiments and 6th South Africans. The front was moving so fast that when night fell, the trains had moved within a few hundred yards of a pocket of resistance. The entire night was punctuated with straffingGerman planes, enemy mortars and machine gun fire; yet by noon the next day the division CP,

Quartermaster and Ordnance were well ahead of them.

The 23d and 24th of April found the troop still moving north at every opportunity. The 2d platoon had relieved 3d platoon in screening the left flank of the division and reporting advance elements when possible. Third platoen was in reserve resting and 1st platoon was attached to 362d Infantry Regiment screening the right flank of the division. During the 24 hours, 31 prisoners were taken.

From the Po River to the end of the activities in Italy, the troop performed its missions with exceptional success. In particular its services as a component part of the "task forces" were particularly fine and deserving of detailed accounts. These assignments had a pure recommaissance flavor and were performed with highly gratifying results.

First platoon characterized their period of operation from 25 April to 1 May with these words, "Travelin, Sheotin', No Eatin', No Sleepin'".

On the 25th of April in compliance to Field Order 47, in which the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was to reconneiter well forward in the division zone in the direction of Legnage, Gerea, and Belvone, the 1st platoon was to work in conjunction with 363d Infantry Regiment and 3d platoon in conjunction with 361st Infantry Regiment.

The plateons were held up most of the morning of the 26th by the difficulties encountered in getting their heavy vehicles across the Po River. In the meantime the infantrymen had crossed the river and gone on ahead. First plateon, when they had finally crossed the Po, caught up with the deughboys near Legnage where their preparations for crossing the Adige River were being hampered by enemy machine gun fire from the right rear flank. Italian Partisans reported approximately 100 Germans by the river. With two tanks attached, the 1st plateon took off with several partisans as guides to find the Jerries. They located several pockets and took 23 prisoners, who had given up when they found themselves covered. There were signs that other enemy forces had withdrawn so the 1st plateon returned to the regiment. Once in the town of Legnage the commanding officer declared the mission accomplished and the planton was relieved.

On the 27th the plateen was ordered to report to General Livesay, who assigned them to "Task Force George", which was composed of 3d battalien of 362d Infantry Regiment, 12 tanks, 6 tank destroyers and attached medics. The task force's mission was to leave Colenga, hit Highway 1091 and work its way to the city of Vincenza. In the morning of the 27th, while this force was grouping, 1st plateen was given the task of finding the best way to the highway and to gather any enemy information of value. Morking cautiousky a out from the town of Colenga in the afterneon, the first obstacle they encountered was a huge German field piece that was in the process of being knocked out by an American plane. As soon as the piece had been wrecked the plateen continued on. Suddenly out from a read that angled into the one they were on came a Jerry peep containing a German major and captain, who were immediately captured. Continuing in their surprise advance, the plateen next run into four Jerries on bicycles, who were also taken priseners. Slowly the armored cars and peep approached the outskirts of the town of Coleredo. In

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the reconnaissance of this town the plateon leader, 1st Lieutenant Edwin P. Riede, was killed by small arms and anti-tank fire. Bunning into strong enemy opposition here the plateon withdrew. Pulling back the plateon came across a German convoy. They poured 37mm and machine gun fire into the column, although darkness somewhat obscured the targets and the effect of the fire on them. After this brief skirmish, one armored car returned to the "Task Force" which had assembled by this time. Joining up with the main body, the formation was briefly as follows: 2 armored cars, next the tanks, then the tank destroyers followed by the infantry mounted in trucks, the nedics, and the remainder of the reconnaissance plateon acting as rear guards.

In the small hours of the morning of the 28th of April the task force passed through Coloredo, this time meeting no opposition. Just before reaching the highway the leading vehicles engaged in a short fire fight in which one German vehicle was knocked out. Hitting the highway the force started north toward Vincenza. There was sporadic small arms fire from both sides of the read but it was so ineffective that it was by-passed without harm. Around a bend in the read and at full speed straight into the column came a German motorcyclist. Machine gun fire cut him down. Moving along slowly but steadily a fire fight developed on the left and a tank was knocked out. Still farther north on the highway what appeared to be four vehicles and a group of men in the early daylight later proved to seven vehicles. After a fierce fire fight the enemy was destroyed. In this short engagement several prisoners were taken and a small ammunition dump hit. Just as daylight began to pock through the hills and trees another short engagement resulted in 100 prisoners. Resistance was stubbern all along the way. Each time the column stopped to clean up a pocket, the rear of the column would be fired upon. Actually there were times when there were two separate fights going on within the column. Sergeant Clark in the lead vehicle spetted a read block and called up a tank which began machinegunning energy personnel around the block. This drew small anti-tank fire and although the tank was hit ten times it was not knocked out, testimeny to the ruggedness of Allied equipment. Fortunately none of the platoons armored cars were hit in this engagement. The road block cleared, movement was detected in a field to the right of the highway. Fire from the tanks set a haystack in the field into a blaze and disclosed an enemy SP gun nearby. While the tanks rendered this useless the platoon armored cars sprayed the field. With the approaching og a group of houses, tanks pulled up and fired into the buildings. The energy returned with small arms fire so the infantry dismounted and nothodically mopped up the resistance. In spite of the stubborness of the enemy, prisoners were taken. Continuing up the highway harassing fire was net every 200 or 300 yards but again it proved ineffective. In the late afternoon and at about 6 kilometers from Vincenza all resistance ceased and it was here that a little comical relief appeared. Sergeant Rogach in one of the leading a rmored cars spotted a man walking up the road toward them. Watching him all the way, at 100 yards he was identified as English. As he drew abreast of the car he turned and with a typical cockney accent said, "There the 'ell 'ave you been? I've been watin' two bloody years for you blokes. "

On the outskirts of Vincenza the task force contacted a similar force from the 361st Infantry Regiment, which had been spearheaded along a parallel route to the city by 3d plateon. The objective had been reached and the force rested and waited while Sergeant Stock in an armored car drove an

infantry lieutenant back to Cologna for orders. On the way back, over the route they had just fought their way over, the two came across an abandoned 88mm alongside the road. Its appearance was somewhat mystifying as it had not been there when they had come up the highway.

Orders came back for the task force to proceed along Highway 53, cross the Brenta River and move beyond it for 2 or 3 kilometers where the 361st task force would take over their task from there.

At 0230 on 29 April, with the li armored cars in the lead, 1st platoon led the force out of Vincenza on Highway 53 half way to the Brenta River; small arms fire from the flank stopped the column. As this resistance was cleared up, a peep from the 38th Infantry Division came up with the startling news that their task force was surrounded at the river. This news had hardly been given when General Livesay came up and the column moved on to where the 88th force was pinned down. Evidently the presence of the 362d Infantry Regiment force relieved the situation. Although very little firing ensued. One armored car crossed the river with the infantry, no others followed as the river bed was sown with butterfly mines. This car returned shortly with the news that the objective had been reached. At 1200 on the 29th the 1st platoen was relieved and reverted to troop reserve.

The 30th saw the platoon catching up on some badly needed sleep, servicing their vehicles and securing their equipment.

The action of the 2d platoon during this same period, 25 April to 1 May, is as follows:

On the 25th, 2d platoon laid claim to the fact that it was one of the first units in the division to have heavy vehicles cross the Po River. Although the platoon was officially in troop reserve, Staff Sergeant Robert Eshleman was ferried across the river by the engineers at approximately 1000, Once across the river the two vehicles began the recommaissance of several bridges across canals and for awhile acted as liaison with forward elements.

On the morning of the 27th on verbal orders from division G-2, the 2d platoon moved southeast from Legnago along the Adige River checking towns and contacting friendly forces. Early in the afternoon the platoon met elements of the 6th South African Armored Division. A little later without engaging in any king of a fight the platoon captured five Russians who said they had been forced into the German Army. Getting low on gas, the platoon returned to the troop CP, where the trains had joined them. After filling their vehicles the platoon went east again on Highway 10, crossed the river at Legnago and reached the city of Colonga at 1700. Inasmuch as Colonga was newly cleared and there were still by-passed pockets of resistance in its vicinity, the 2d platoon was ordered to establish outposts around the town for the night.

Relieved from this duty on the morning of the 28th a new mission was given them. The town of Sossano hadn't been cleared and the platoon was to go up and clear it. Picking up two partisans as guides, who said they knew where the Germans were hiding, the men and vehicles set out over a back read. About one mile from the town they saw a column of Germans in the distance walking down a railroad track. With all eyes on these men, the platoen



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almost failed to notice that the ditches along the road they were on, were full of Germans. The leading three armored cars almost passed them completely before they were sighted. Suddenly someone spotted them and the fight was on. Once fire on, the Jerries, approximately a company of them, opened up with small arms. As the platoon's fire power began to tell; some of the Germans took refuge in a ditch alongside a building. However, 37mm fire from the armored cars bursting against the building just over their heads drove the Jerrics out. Such fire was actually improvised cerial bursts. The front and the rear of the platoon column were each fighting a separate battle. For approximately 10 minutes it lasted and then the Germans gave up. Several of them were killed, more wounded, including their commanding officer, and 67 were taken as prisoners. The platoon had not suffered a single casualty. While the prisoners and the wounded were being escorted to the rear the rest of the platoon went on to Sessano. Reaching the village they found it cleared of enemy but they reconnoitered a small bridge over a canal beyond the town before they pulled back for gas and ammunition. That evening they received a new mission. They were to travel that night so as to relieve the 1st platoon northeast of Vincenza on Highway 53.

At 1200 on the 29th of April, the 2d platoon relieved the 1st platoon on Highway 53 just before the Brenta River. Supposed to contact the 363d Infantry Regiment, the platoon crossed the river and failing to find any elements of the infantry there began to work the roads parallel to the river to gain any enemy information.

Early on the morning of the 30th working back to Highway 53 the platoon finally contacted the 363d Infantry Regiment at 0700. The commanding officer gave the platoon the mission of clearing out resisting Germans (1) in the vicinity of Spineda; (2) in Castelfrance; and (3) in surrounding areas. These orders were carried out methodically and efficiently and at the end of the day the platoon reported to the 363d Infantry Regiment assembly area.

On May 1st the 2d platoon was ordered to clean out Montebeluna and its vicinity of the Germans reported to be there. Reaching the town partisans greeted them and informed them that there were Germans there who wished to surrender Major General Zwade and his staff to the 2d platoon.

An estimated 1300 soldiers gave up also. The general surrendered his personal pistol to 1st Lieutenant Franco, the platoon leader. Lieutenant Franco requisitioned buildings in the torm for PM enclosures, gathered all surrendered arms, sent the general and his staff back to division headquarters, and avaited orders. When trucks and personnel from the division arrived the platoon was relieved and rejoined the troop just outside of Treviso.

On the 25th of April at 1800, the 3d platoon was ferried across the Po River at Sermide with orders to report to 3d Battalion of the 361st Infantry Regiment, although their exact location was unknown. It the small village of Ponto the platoon ran into a small fire fight and encountered a road block which forced them to turn their vehicles around under fire and withdraw. The 362d Infantry Regiment later cleared this area. Contacting the commanding officer of the 361st Infantry Regiment the platoon started a joint mission with the infantry at about 2300. They were to recommittee roads in the area of Legnago. Working out in front of the doughboy force about 11 kilometers the platoon reached the outskirts of Legnago without

meeting any resistance. Stopping near the main highway leading to the town, the men heard heavy vehicular traffic ahead of them. Taking every precaution the platoon turned their vehicles around and continued to listen. A tank detached itself from the enemy column on the highway and was coming their way. The platoon withdrew and reported this information to the commanding officer of the 361st Infantry Regiment and the mission was completed at 2400.

On the 26th of April the platoon joined the 361st Infantry Regiment but remained inactive waiting for orders to move their vehicles across the Adige River.

At 1715 on the 27th the platoon crossed the river at Legnage and traveled the rest of the day to contact the 361st Infantry Regiment which had crossed the river previously. They joined the regiment just north of Colonga.

On the 28th of April the 3d platoon become a part of the task force to work its way from Colonga to Vincenza by meens of secondary roads. The force was composed of 3d Battalion of 361st Enfantry Regiment attached tank destroyers and the 3d platoon of the recommissance troop.

As the column pulled out it was formed in the following manner: The three armored cars (platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and section sergeant) in the lead, the three tank destroyers, the plateon's peeps and last the infantry mounted in trucks. One armored car and one peep was left with the regiment for communication purposes. Heading northeast, the column oncountered no opposition for seven or eight miles and then it came upon a tank trap. By-passing this to the southeast the column reached Orangia, where it not another trap. Partisans came up and told the men that there were Germans on a nearby hill who could direct fire on the road. The three armored cars flanked the hill to the left and attacked the Germans. In the ensuing fire fight the doughboys were called up and with supporting fire from the armored cars the area was cleaned out and approximately 100 prisoners were taken. With the prisoners being escorted to the rear the force contimued on its mission for another five miles. Encountering ten Germans with two bicycles around a bend in the road, eight of them surrendered and remaining two were killed. Partisans came up and pointed out dug-in positions ahead near the road and claimed there were Germans in them. The column shot up these positions although there were no signs of enemy about. One mile south of Vincenza the force came up a secondary highway which led into the city. Walking down the highway were six Germans. The leading vehicles began firing and the Germans scattered into the fields along the read. One, however was captured and the tank destroyers came up and proceeded to shell the field. Hoving into the outskirts of town they met the 362d task force. Together they moved into form to find elements of the 88th division already there. They stayed in Vincenza all night.

The next morning, the 29th of April, the 3d plateon was still attached to the 3d Rattalion of the 36lst Infantry Regiment. The task force from 362d Infantry had moved ahead to secure a bridgehead across the Brenta River on Highway 53 but had met resistance 6 kilometers northeast of S. Pietro and were being held up. The four armored cars of the 3d plateon, with accompanying peeps, were sent out along to the southeast in search of

another river crossing in the vicinity of Grantorto. Moving out they had gone about a mile when they ran into a group of partisans who reported some twenty Germans in a house on the left of the road. The armored cars moved up, covered the houses and the Germans came out and surrendered. As the Germans filed out of the house, one long German came up from the other direction waving a white flag saying there were thirty more nearby, who wished to surrender. A peop was sent up and they were marched back. Together again the platoon proceeded down the road until Partisans stopped them and reported fifteen Germans sleeping in a barn. Five men dismounted and went to the place where they captured the sleeping men. These prisoners were turned over to an infantry peop which had come up on the column's rear.

Sergeant Olson with two armored cars had moved some distance down the road and come upon some thirty-five Germans shaving, washing and proposing breakfast. Capturing them they were also turned over to the infantry men in the peop. The two armored cars writing for Sergeant Olson in the meantime had spotted four Jermies walking down the road. When they were about fifty yards from the cars, Staff Sergeant Trahan ran out towards them and with a pistol. Seeing the Americans for the first time, three of the enemy started running. Staff Sorgeant Trahan fired one shot at one who dropped his rifle in order to make better speed, while one was hit by machine gun fire and another captured by a partisan. The Goman who had immediately given himself up was searched and four knives were found concealed in his The wounded man was removed to the rear, and the plateon regrouped before it proceeded on its mission. A mile farther on Partisons again reported Germans in a house just off the road, who wanted to surrender. With the amored cars covering, the Partisans, they brought them out. Finally arriving in Grantoro they found the town clear and received a message to disregard the mission and return. At 1400 the platoon was on its way back when Partisans reported many Germans in a house 300 yards off the read. With two armored cars covering and two moving on the house, over seventy Germans came out and gave themselves up. Two peeps were called up to take charge of the prischers and march them back to the rear. With the prisoners on their way under the charge of Corporal Greancy and Corporal Hibbs, the remainder of the plateon headed back to the highway. Acaching it they found it packed with traffic but finally managed to work their way in. Just as they had done so a message came from the two peeps with the prisoners for the plateon to return as there was liable to be trouble back there. The plateon turned off the crowled highway at the next road only to find it filled with knocked out vehicles. Using the leading car as a bulldozer the platoon began to push its way back to the two peeps.

In the meantime Corporal Greaney and Corporal Hibbs, who were guarding their prisoners as they marched along the road had sighted eight or ten heavily armed Germans crossing the road ahead of them. They stopped the column of prisoners and watched the Germans ahead, who had now spotted the pacps. For a few minutes both parties just stared, then a Partisan went forward and talked with the Germans. On his return he teld Corporal Greaney that the non-ahead wished to surrender. Expecting a trick, Greaney and Hibbs went forward cautiously. The non-commissioned officer in charge of the group said in his broken English that he wished to give up so Greaney had them throw their arms into a nearby canal. Just as they did this, Germans swarmed out of nearby houses. This was when the peops called to the platoon for help,

Two officers came up to Greaney and Hibbs and wanted to know what was going on. Greaney explained and asked then if they wished to surrender also. One officer, a captain, said he had no intentions of doing so. Hastily Greaney and Hibbs began to tell him how hopeless his position was and the captain hesitated. Finally he agreed, only to insist that he would surrender only to an officer. Hibbs persuaded the captain, and the other officer, a major, to get in his peep and he would take them to the platoon leader where they could surrender to him. Just as Corporal Hibb's car pulled away the platoon came up and covered the entire group of Germans with the armored cars. All German weapons were dumped into the canal and they were lined up with the original group of prisoners. It the highway they came across Hibbs and the surrouder was completed. Farther down the road they turned the entire group, 350 men, over to the MP's. They had captured a complete paratroop battalion.

In rejoining the 3d battalion, the platoon run into traffic trouble. Finally they crossed the Brenta River and continued on Highway 53 to Cittadella, where they were supposed to neet the infantry, but when they arrived the doughboys had left. East of the term the platoon column, led by the four armored cars (platoon sergeant, platoon leader, and the armored section sergeants) followed by the peeps, came upon an infantry unjor in the ditch by the side of the read, who said he had spotted seme Jerries. It first investigations failed to disclose may. However, before the column moved, four Germans were seen and when the platoon opened fire, fifteen more rose up in the field waving white flags to surrender. These prisoners were turned over to the major and his driver.

lifter a short but fileree fire flight in the town of Vedalago the plateon drove on through the town toward the outskirts where they shot up a group of enemy vehicles, turned over the captives to a group of Special Police. Who came up the highway behind the plateon. Six more priseners. walked into surrender farther down the road. Just outside the town of Istrana, the plateen finally contacted the rear of the 3d battalion column which had been separated from the front part of the column when it had been attacked by a number of Germans. When the 3d plateon came up the fight had just ended and the infantrymen had captured 400 Germans. Leaving two platoons and two tank destroyers to guard the captured men the rest of the doughboys prepared to move on and rejoin the front part of their column. A formation was made up and with two of 3d platoon armored cars in the lead followed by two tanks, the rest of the recommaissance platoon and the trucks of infantrymen, the group set out. The column traveled slowly as it was dark and the surrounding areas more than likely infested with the enemy. Llong the road on the left the leading chaments of the column saw several parked vagons but paid them little attention thinking they had already been knocked out. Suddenly there were cries of, "Hault! Hault!", in a very foreign tongue and ahead across the middle of the road there appeared a vagon as a read block. Sergoant Truban in the leading car had passed the trugons by this time and to ive some sort of warning to the rear of the column he fired three shots at three cyclists which loomed up in the darkness. Those were the only shots fired. The point M-8 crashed through the flimecy road block in a true cavalry charge and the whole force proceeded down the read. One kilometer farther down the read there was a brief fire fight but it was too dark to see the results. Continuing another two kiloneters, they not a peop from the 3d battalion, which was returning from the advance elements of the battalion

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to see what had happened to the rear units. They had just realized that they had been split into the parts. With this peop as a guide the column neved up to the outstirts of Trevise, where it joined the rest of the infinity. On. Everyone resulted here for the remainder of the night.

On the morning of the 30th of April at 11.00 the plateon moved out on Mighway 53 to secure a bridgehead across a river north of the city. However, it had already been secured that morning at 0300 by the Exitish so they returned to Trevise. Here they were ordered by the division to patrol the bilitary between Castelfrance and Trevise; an angineer envey had been cabushed cast of Vedelage. The patrol composed of four amored cars began between 1200-1300 bours. It Vedelage they participated in a small fire fight. Spreading their amored cars through a convey of Afric, anti-tent near and Headquarters Company, 91st Infantry Division, the plateon escented them safely through to Trevise. Returning they picked up methor convey consisting of division headquarters and signal company; this convey was escented through without trouble. By 1900 hours truffic on the highway was a strick that the plakeon caused patrolling and with their mission coupleted they settled down for some well carned rest before rejoining the troop.

c. Concret Remarks:

- (1) The organization of the plateon as outlined in the previous report submitted, four (h) amoved cars and five (f) 1/h ton vehicles per plateon has worked very pathefactory. It will be noted that many times during the action described above it was not uncomenfor a column to be engaged in all-around or two separate fights at one time. By having this additional amoved car, the plateon constants able to divide his force and still relation a force with sufficient fire power in each. The mission of maintaining limison with assault elements was also especiated by the four armored cars per plateon as it give the plateon leaser four highware FM cata (SCR-508). He was able to place one armored car and 1/h ton with each assault battalion and one amoved car and 1/h ton with each regimental command group. Many times these units would be separated beyond the range of the company used off-10.
- (2) The organization of the troop is outlined in the last report is still in effect with the exception of two 6 x 6 trucks in lieu of two helithricks in the supply section and the lisison radio is now mounted in a 3/h ton respons carrier instead of a 3/h ton 0 & 1 car. This organization still believes the redistribution of the vehicles is advisable. During the past operation—which was ideal for light amored rechanization—the troop was able to maintain its rebility, readily effect re-supply, able to rain—tain so canications and make maximum use of its available fire power.
- (3) During previous operations the trains noved quite independently of the troop CP, noving only then the bine and space distances required. The troop command post like doe newed on an Independent axis from the division CP. During this operation, however, the division command axis was followed and the troop's trains noved with, or followed by a few hours, the troop CP. The trains bivouse area was as near to the troop CP as possible. The reserve plateon was also kept in the immediate vicinity of the command post. As next every daily move was from 10 to 20 miles and the emphasis was on forward

traffic it was impossible for the platoons to return a nessenger very for for supplies, thus the supplies had to be kept well forward.

(4) For coordination with the infantry regiments, the regimental commander, regimental S-3, the troop commander and the plateon commanders, would get together and work out the details. The tocop's mission would be viewed in the light of how it could be accomplished the best and assist the infantry regiments. Many times the plateon, though working on a division mission would be taking orders from the regimental commander or the assault battalion commander. This may appear to allow for the development of conflicting orders; but on the contrary, it enchanced the discremention of information and made for closer cooperation of all concerned.

/s/ Clifford E. Lippincott
CLIFFORD E. LIFPINCOTT;
Captain, Cavelry, Condg.